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Note 
 
Blowing Up the Pipes: The Use of (c)(4) to 
Dismantle Campaign Finance Reform 
Cory G. Kalanick∗ 
President Obama lamented in his first State of the Union 
Address: “With all due deference to separation of powers, last 
week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I be-
lieve will open the floodgates for special interests . . . to spend 
without limit in our elections.”1 Most political observers and le-
gal scholars understood the truth of this prophecy and the sig-
nificant impact that Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
mission2 would have on campaign finance.3 However, few 
casual observers would have ever envisioned that this political 
sea change would come from seemingly nonpolitical social-
welfare nonprofits.4  
America’s enterprising tendencies have produced an indus-
try around politics that breeds entrepreneurialism and rewards 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2007, 
Boston University. I would like to thank Professor David Schultz for his elec-
tion law insight and guidance on earlier drafts, Laura Arneson for helpful 
comments and feedback, and the Minnesota Law Review Editors and Staff for 
all their hard work. I would also like to thank my family for their constant 
support and encouragement, especially my loving wife Kate, who has been 
with me every step of the way. Copyright © 2011 by Cory G. Kalanick. 
 1. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address 8 (Jan. 27, 
2010), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/DCPD-201000055 
.pdf (emphasis added to highlight the President’s use of the storied political-
money-as-water metaphor). 
 2. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 3. However, some disagreed with the sentiment. For example, Supreme 
Court Justice Samuel Alito “mouthed a silent ‘not true’ to protest the President’s 
characterization” during the State of the Union Address. Karl Crow, Citizens 
United v. FEC: Protecting Free Speech for Nonprofit and For-Profit Corpora-
tions, CAPITAL RES. CENTER, 1 (June 2010), http://www.capitalresearch.org/ 
pubs/pdf/v1275085482.pdf. 
 4. Social welfare nonprofits are codified at I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2010). See 
infra Part I.A.2. While some donors actually began using § 501(c)(4) groups in 
previous elections, § 527 organizations have remained the dominant tool for 
outside money in modern politics. See infra Part I.A.1. 
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exploitation of campaign finance loopholes.5 Modern political 
financiers have searched far and wide for pockets of “soft mon-
ey” because of its precious quality of limitless use without regu-
lation under federal election laws.6 Entrepreneurs on the right 
were particularly active after the 2008 presidential election.7 
The loopholes taken advantage of by political financiers threat-
en the very nature of the democratic process by shielding 
“veiled political actors,” and these entities often resemble “Rus-
sian matryoshka dolls” because “each layer is removed only to 
find another layer obscuring the real source of money.”8 The 
latest round of exploitation occurred in the 2010 midterm elec-
tions when donors participated in blatant political activities 
behind the façade of social welfare nonprofits.9  
This Note examines the rise of § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organi-
zations as a modern tool for bypassing campaign finance regu-
lation. Part I explores the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax 
code to juxtapose the history and purpose of § 527 political or-
ganizations with similar objectives of § 501(c)(4) social welfare 
nonprofits. This Part also analyzes the advantages and disad-
vantages of using each entity as a vehicle for political contribu-
tions, and details the use of § 501(c)(4) nonprofits in the 2010 
 
 5. See Doyle McManus, Republicans’ Secret Formula, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 2010, at 21, available at 2010 WLNR 21028182 (“Like almost every pursuit 
in this free-enterprise country, political campaigning is a business. And, as in 
many businesses, success often goes not to the entrepreneur who brings a 
product to market first but to the one who exploits it best.”). 
 6. Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Limits and Op-
portunities for Non-Profit Groups in Federal Elections, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 
256–57 (2004) (comparing “soft money,” defined as “funds coming directly from 
corporate or union treasuries or funds given in excess of the individual and 
PAC contribution limits,” with “hard money,” which is “money for federal 
campaigns that comes from legal sources, subject to contribution limits, and 
reported to the Federal Election Commission”). 
 7. This Note examines use of the campaign finance loophole by conserva-
tives in the 2010 midterm elections, but it is important to note that liberal 
third-party groups—such as the Sierra Club—have also utilized § 501(c)(4) 
entities, and Democrats will likely do so at an increasing rate in future elec-
tions. See infra Part I.B. 
 8. Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Cam-
paign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 296 (2005). 
 9. See Complaint at 4–5, Pub. Citizen v. Crossroads Grassroots Political 
Strategies (F.E.C. Oct. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Complaint, Crossroads G.P.S.], 
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/FEC-ComplaintAmericanxroads 
GPS101310.pdf (“The deployment of section 501(c)(4) organizations in 2010 as 
a vehicle for undisclosed money to pay for partisan activities to influence fed-
eral elections is simply the latest chapter in the long history of efforts to evade 
and violate federal campaign finance laws.”). For facts on the sources of 2010 
midterm political dollars, see infra Part I.B. 
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midterm elections. Part II builds the case for increased regula-
tion and assesses legal and political arguments for and against 
four options for regulating § 501(c)(4) groups, including: 
(1) stepped-up executive enforcement through the IRS; (2) legal 
suits under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(FECA)10 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA);11 (3) caps on total contributions to § 501(c)(4)s; and 
(4) legislative requirements for compelled disclosure. Part III 
argues that disclosure and disclaimer requirements are the 
best option for reforming § 501(c)(4) political activity. Whether 
policymakers resort to disclosure or utilize any other options, 
this Note concludes that reform of § 501(c)(4) political activity 
must occur quickly before future elections further undermine 
the current campaign finance regime. 
I.  TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND 
THE 2010 MIDTERM ELECTIONS   
In order to understand why the § 501(c)(4) nonprofit has 
been elevated as the current campaign finance loophole of 
choice, it is important to comprehend the intersection of tax ex-
emptions, politics, and soft money in American political history. 
Accordingly, the first section examines the historical develop-
ment of the tax treatment of nonprofit political activity by look-
ing at two entities: (1) § 527 political organizations, and 
(2) § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations. The second section 
turns to the midterm elections of 2010 to demonstrate how the 
§ 501(c)(4) loophole is increasingly being exploited to allow 
nonpolitical social welfare nonprofits to funnel money into elec-
toral activities.  
A. NONPROFIT ENTITIES: THE INTERSECTION OF POLITICS AND 
THE TAX CODE  
This section begins the analysis of nonprofit political activ-
ity by examining the § 527 political organization, which was the 
first nonprofit involved in electoral politics and continues to be 
utilized by many campaign financiers.12 Then, the section turns 
its attention to the history and purpose of nonprofit entities 
traditionally concerned with nonpolitical activities, such as so-
 
 10. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006). 
 11. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections 
of 2 U.S.C.). 
 12. See, e.g., infra note 74 and accompanying text (noting Karl Rove’s use 
of both § 527 and § 501(c)(4) entities in the 2010 midterm elections). 
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cial welfare nonprofits organized under § 501(c)(4). The section 
concludes by comparing and contrasting the two entities with 
respect to political donors’ abilities to utilize such entities for 
electoral activities.  
1. Section 527 Political Organizations: The Modern Tax 
Foundation for Soft Money in Politics 
Traditionally, political organizations that put resources in-
to campaigning for elected officials did not qualify for tax-
exempt status.13 That all changed in 1974 when Congress wrote 
§ 527 into the tax code.14 Somewhat surprisingly, the creation 
of tax exemptions for entities primarily engaged in influencing 
elections was part of a broader movement of post-Watergate re-
forms.15 Section 527 defines a “political organization” as “a par-
ty, committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether 
or not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the 
purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or mak-
ing expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.”16 The tax 
code essentially defines “exempt function” as influencing elec-
tions.17 All such political groups organized under the tax code 
are exempt from federal income taxation.18 
Political organizations formed under § 527 originally acted 
to “coordinate voter registration or turnout drives,” and also 
 
 13. Holman, supra note 6, at 266; Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and 
Taxable Entities: Are They the Next “Loophole”?, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 
41, 54 (2007). See generally Tobin, supra, at 67–74 (chronicling the history of 
tax treatment of political organizations).  
 14. Tobin, supra note 13, at 54. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating 
the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens 
United 60–69 (Loyola-L.A. Law Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 2010-57, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1727565 (detail-
ing IRS treatment of § 527 organizations). 
 15. See Holman, supra note 6, at 266. The tax code did not include any 
disclosure requirements for § 527 organizations, however, because lawmakers 
at the time assumed that financial activity would come to light through re-
quired disclosure to the Federal Election Commission. Id.  
 16. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2010). 
 17. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2) (“The term ‘exempt function’ means the function of 
influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or 
appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or 
office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-
Presidential electors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected, 
nominated, elected, or appointed.”). 
 18. I.R.C. § 527(a); see also Paul S. Ryan, 527s in 2008: The Past, Present, 
and Future of 527 Organization Political Activity Regulation, 45 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 471, 480–81 (2008) (detailing the qualifications for tax-exempt political 
organizations). 
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“campaign[ed] on specific issues.”19 However, partisan opera-
tives soon realized that they could utilize political organiza-
tions entirely for influencing electoral outcomes and still retain 
the tax-exempt benefits.20 Moreover, they could do so without 
having to disclose the identity of their donors because these or-
ganizations were regulated solely under the jurisdiction of the 
IRS, allowing them to avoid federal election disclosure re-
quirements.21 The first major electoral use of the § 527 loophole 
was effected by the Sierra Club.22 While the Republican Party 
traditionally raised its funds through hard money, Democrats 
realized their soft money advantage with Bill Clinton at the 
helm.23 Donors on the right quickly followed their ideological 
opposites into the § 527 game during the 2000 Republican pri-
mary when brothers Charles and Sam Wyly—wealthy friends 
of George W. Bush—targeted John McCain through a § 527 or-
ganization dubbed “Republicans for Clean Air.”24 Through “is-
sue advocacy,”25 § 527 organizations provided an alluring alter-
native to Political Action Committees (PACs) for wealthy 
donors, corporations, and labor unions seeking to circumvent 
the $5000 contribution limit.26 Congress responded to the sly 
tactics in 2000 with requirements that § 527 organizations dis-
 
 19. Lauren Daniel, Note, 527s in a Post-Swift Boat Era: The Current and 
Future Role of Issue Advocacy Groups in Presidential Elections, 5 NW. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 149, 152 (2010). 
 20. Ryan, supra note 18, at 480; see also Holman, supra note 6, at 266 
(“Two decades later, however, non-profit groups transformed Section 527 into 
a campaign finance loophole.”). 
 21. See Holman, supra note 6, at 266 (“Section 527 status was subject only 
to the tax code, which did not require public disclosure of financial activity, 
rather than the elections code, which did require disclosure.”). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See McManus, supra note 5 (“Democrats have been no slouches in 
finding innovative ways to funnel millions into political campaigning. In 1996, 
then-President Clinton held dozens of events in the White House to encourage 
donors to give ‘soft money’ to Democratic causes.”). 
 24. Holman, supra note 6, at 266. Though the Wyly brothers were later 
revealed as the funders of the group, their identities were unknown at the 
time. Id. 
 25. See Daniel, supra note 19, at 152–53 (describing the issue advoca-
cy/express advocacy distinction created by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)). 
 26. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 66–67 (4th ed. Supp. 2010) [hereinafter LOWENSTEIN ET AL., 
SUPPLEMENT] (referring to political organizations as “shadow parties”); see al-
so Daniel, supra note 19, at 150 (“527s provide a vehicle through which wealthy 
individuals can redirect limitless contributions that would otherwise be sub-
ject to strict caps if received by political parties or individual candidates.”). 
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close contributions to the IRS.27 However, these reforms had 
little impact on the forward march of the entity’s use as a cam-
paign finance loophole, and four years later, the presidential 
election delivered to the country “the year of the 527 organiza-
tion.”28  
Seeking to close the loophole, citizens brought suit to clas-
sify § 527 political organizations as “political committees” sub-
ject to regulation under federal election law.29 In response, the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) equivocated. Instead of 
undertaking a thorough rulemaking process that could have 
clarified the scope of regulations and established bright-line 
guidance, the commission opted for a case-by-case approach.30 
Despite this failure, the FEC did assess fines against some of 
the worst offenders for failing to register as political commit-
tees—but not until after another election cycle had come and 
gone.31 As a result, the FEC penalties had “little deterrent ef-
fect” because they were so small, and were ultimately seen as 
merely the “cost of doing business.”32 
It is worth noting that the § 527 organization is still the 
only tax-exempt organization that can set its primary purpose 
to focus on politics.33 The involvement of the FEC began to 
patch up some leaks in the federal election pipes, but as a re-
sult, big-money donors began to search out new nonprofit loop-
 
 27. Holman, supra note 6, at 266; see also Garrett & Smith, supra note 8, 
at 318 (“In July 2000, Congress closed . . . the gap by passing legislation re-
quiring Section 527 political organizations to disclose contributions of $200 or 
more and expenditures of $500 or more.”); Aprill, supra note 14, at 66 (noting 
the quick congressional reaction to concern over “stealth” § 527 organizations).  
 28. Ryan, supra note 18, at 473 (quoting Richard Briffault, The 527 Prob-
lem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 949 (2005)). In 
that year, § 527 groups spent $400 million influencing federal elections. Id. 
Contributing $24 million, liberal donor George Soros was the biggest individu-
al contributor to § 527 political organizations. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., 
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 26, at 67. 
 29. See Ryan, supra note 18, at 473 (“As a result, 527 organizations that 
should have registered, but did not register, as federal political committees in 
2004 and 2006 illegally raised and spent hundreds of millions of dollars to in-
fluence federal elections . . . .”). 
 30. See id. (discussing the case-by-case approach adopted by the FEC).  
 31. Daniel, supra note 19, at 167; see also Ryan, supra note 18, at 490, 
493–94 (detailing the conciliation enforcement agreement between the Swift 
Boat Veterans for Truth and the FEC).  
 32. Daniel, supra note 19, at 168. 
 33. Tobin, supra note 13, at 54. 
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holes. And thus, the § 501(c)(4) organization made its political 
debut.34 
2. In Contrast: Social Welfare Organizations 
When juxtaposed with § 527 organizations, the nonpolitical 
history of § 501(c)(4) entities becomes strikingly apparent. Con-
gress passed legislation in 1913 upon the request of the Cham-
ber of Commerce for a “civic and commercial” organization tax 
exemption.35 The current statutory formulation provides tax-
exempt status for  
[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated 
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of 
employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a 
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net 
earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, 
or recreational purposes.36 
The statutory text essentially gives rise to two categories: 
(1) “social welfare organizations,” and (2) “local associations of 
employees.”37 Civic associations and volunteer fire companies 
provide the best examples of these respective categories.38 In 
examining the impact on the current political landscape, this 
Note focuses on the former classification. 
In contrast to the political groups organized under § 527 of 
the tax code, § 501(c)(4) historically led to the creation of non-
profits focused on a myriad of community interests. For exam-
ple, § 501(c)(4) gave rise to entities designed to promote com-
munity art, neighborhood beautification, and housing/ 
community redevelopment.39 Additional groups include cultural 
organizations designed to promote local customs through an-
nual festivals, organizations that operate recreational roller-
 
 34. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., SUPPLEMENT, supra note 26, at 67 (“As the 
FEC began to regulate 527 organizations, albeit on a case-by-case basis, some 
election-related activity shifted to 501(c) organizations and newer ‘taxable’ 
nonprofits. Among other things 501 status may make it easier for groups to 
hide the identity of their donors.”); Daniel, supra note 19, at 175 (“Some pun-
dits assert that 527s have not so much disappeared as they have evolved into a 
new breed—nonprofit, ‘social welfare’ groups.”). 
 35. JOHN FRANCIS REILLY ET AL., IRS 501(C)(4) ORGANIZATIONS, at I-2 
(2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici03.pdf. 
 36. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2010).  
 37. REILLY ET AL., supra note 35, at I-2. 
 38. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 557: TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 
FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 45 (2010) [hereinafter PUBLICATION 557], available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf. 
 39. See REILLY ET AL., supra note 35, at I-4 to I-10 (citing to various reve-
nue rulings regarding social welfare organizations). 
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skating rinks, entities designed to facilitate cooperation with a 
parent-teacher association, and even a gun range organized to 
provide safety lessons for the use of rifles, shotguns, and pis-
tols.40 Other groups that are tax-exempt under § 501(c)(4) in-
clude veterans’ associations, as well as homeowners’ and ten-
ants’ associations.41 
The key to § 501(c)(4) status is the social benefit. The IRS 
regulations make clear that a nonprofit operates “exclusively 
for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in 
promoting in some way the common good and general welfare 
of the people of the community.”42 The regulations elaborate on 
this point by stipulating that a social welfare organization “is 
one which is operated primarily for the purpose of bringing 
about civic betterments and social improvements.”43 More per-
tinent to this discussion, however, is what the regulations say 
about politics: “The promotion of social welfare does not include 
direct or indirect participation or intervention in political cam-
paigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public 
office.”44 Although there are exceptions to this general rule in 
the regulations, the basic premise is apparent: political activ-
ism and social welfare are mutually exclusive—at least when 
determining whether an organization’s primary purpose is ex-
clusively for social welfare. 
Despite this clear intention, § 501(c)(4) nonprofits have 
been permitted to participate in some political activity relevant 
to their organization’s primary purpose so long as no more than 
half of the overall activities are political.45 In order to prove 
that an organization meets the statutory requirement, the IRS 
has established the “major purpose” test. An entity passes 
§ 501(c)(4) muster if it can demonstrate that it devotes more 
than half of its resources to the promotion of social welfare 
 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id.  
 42. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (emphasis added); see also PUBLICATION 
557, supra note 38, at 45–46. 
 45. Although fifty percent is the general rule of thumb, opinions vary re-
garding how much political activity actually constitutes “primary purpose.” 
See Aprill, supra note 14, at 50 (citing academic support for a fifty percent 
threshold, the ABA Tax Section recommendation of a “40 percent safe harbor,” 
and a proposed sliding scale approach).  
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causes previously discussed, rather than to politics.46 Note, 
however, that acts of lobbying and public education are not 
considered political activity, and can be conducted to further a 
group’s social welfare purpose.47 Section 501(c)(4) organizations 
are subject to tax on political advertisements made to the ex-
tent that they deviate from standard public policy expression.48 
Factors demonstrating taxable political communication focus 
on communications that identify a candidate, the timing of the 
ad near a political campaign, targeting of voters, the inclusion 
of a candidate’s policy position, and the extent to which one 
candidate is distinguished from other candidates.49 When a 
§ 501(c)(4) nonprofit does take part in the political process, it 
must file a Political Organization Income Tax Return.50  
Social welfare nonprofits and political organizations are 
similar in that they are both exempt from federal income tax, 
can receive unlimited donations, and their donors cannot write 
off the tax contributions.51 However, when it comes to permit-
ted activities and associated requirements, the two entities di-
verge. Section 527 organizations can participate in unlimited 
political activity, but can conduct only limited lobbying ef-
forts.52 Further, political organizations accepting or spending 
more than $25,000 a year must disclose expenditures and con-
tributions—including the identities of their donors—to the IRS 
through regular electronic reports similar to those made to the 
FEC by political committees, and the IRS makes these reports 
public on its website.53 The IRS penalty for nondisclosure is the 
 
 46. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, 
§§ 7.25.4.6–.8 (1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/irm_07-025 
-004.html [hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL]; Crow, supra note 3, at 4 
(“[T]he IRS ‘major purpose’ test . . . means the majority of expenditures made 
by these organizations must be for its tax-exempt programs and purposes, and 
not for political candidates.”).  
 47. Ryan, supra note 18, at 478–79.  
 48. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 46, § 7.25.4.7(1) (“IRC 
501(c)(4) organizations are subject to the tax imposed by IRC 527 on any ex-
penditure for a political activity that comes within the meaning of IRC 
527(e)(2).” (citing Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332)).  
 49. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328–30. 
 50. PUBLICATION 557, supra note 38, at 46. 
 51. See Ryan, supra note 18, at 482 (comparing the benefits and burdens 
of tax-exempt organizations in a chart).  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 481 & n.41; see also PUBLICATION 557, supra note 38, at 12–13; 
Holman, supra note 6, at 266. Section 527 organizations registered as “politi-
cal committees” must make disclosures directly to the FEC. See Ryan, supra 
note 18, at 483. 
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loss of the tax exemption on the undisclosed amount.54 Section 
501(c)(4) entities, on the other hand, can conduct unlimited 
lobbying, but cannot spend all of their resources on political ac-
tivity. However, they are not subject to the same registration 
and disclosure requirements as § 527 groups. Although they 
must file financial activity reports with the IRS on an annual 
basis, these reports are only required in paper form, and to the 
extent that any donors are listed in the report, their identities 
are not made available to the public.55 Hence, while there are 
some limitations on using § 501(c)(4) nonprofits for campaign 
purposes, the nondisclosure benefit makes them “a potentially 
more lucrative soft money conduit than even Section 527s.”56 
While 2004 was the “the year of the 527,”57 the previously 
discussed changes in the political fundraising landscape led to 
the dubbing of the 2010 midterms as “the 501(c)(4) election.”58 
The next section examines the implications that Citizens Unit-
ed had on the nonprofit world, and details the increasing use of 
social welfare nonprofits in funding the 2010 elections.  
B. ENTER STAGE RIGHT: THE RISE OF 501(C)(4)S IN THE 2010 
MIDTERM ELECTIONS 
President Obama’s State of the Union forecast proved true 
as Citizens United ripped open the possibilities inherent in the 
nonprofit loophole. Although it has been suggested that the de-
cision’s biggest impact was a psychological one, there have been 
real effects.59 While the “nightmare situation” of a corporate 
“Super Bowl-style frenzy of advertising bearing their company 
logos” has not yet come to fruition, nonprofits have become the 
covert means of political financing due to their ability to collect 
unlimited contributions without disclosure.60 Although 
 
 54. See Ryan, supra note 18, at 481 (referring to the penalty as a “non-
disclosure option”). See generally Aprill, supra note 14, at 67 (detailing registra-
tion and disclosure requirements, as well as penalties for § 527 organizations).  
 55. See Holman, supra note 6, at 267–68 (calling these requirements “lax”).  
 56. Id. at 268.  
 57. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 58. Rick Cohen, The New Normal of Money in Politics, NONPROFIT Q. (Nov. 
3, 2010), http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=6956:the-new-normal-of-money-in-politics&catid=155:nonprofit 
-newswire&Itemid=986. 
 59. Michael Luo, Changes Have Money Talking Louder Than Ever in Mid-
terms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at A13 [hereinafter Luo, Changes], available 
at 2010 WL 20105301. 
 60. Id. 
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§ 501(c)(4) nonprofits could have done this prior to Citizens 
United, the decision allows them to pay for political communi-
cations directly from their general treasury.61 Moreover, such 
communications had been previously limited to noncandidate-
oriented issue ads, but Citizens United opened the door to ex-
press advocacy for or against a candidate.62  
In the aftermath of the decision, Senator Russ Feingold, a 
champion of campaign finance reform, bemoaned that the 
“[n]ext time voters want to send us a message at the ballot box, 
they may find their voices drowned out by wealthy corporations 
with their own special-interest agendas.”63 Indeed, without 
reform, the 2010 midterms are a precursor for what is to come 
in future elections. 
The midterms witnessed political spending amounting to a 
whopping $4 billion—or put another way, $45 for every single 
person that turned out to the polls.64 Of the total amount, near-
ly $293 million came from outside groups, which is only $9 mil-
lion less than in the last presidential election, but more than 
$224 million more than in the last midterm election.65 More-
over, at least $138 million came from interest groups with anon-
ymous donors.66 With these figures, the true impact of Citizens 
 
 61. Crow, supra note 3, at 3. For a comprehensive overview of the Citizens 
United opinion and its place in campaign finance jurisprudence, see Richard L. 
Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 
585–603 (2011). 
 62. Michael Luo, Groups Push Legal Limits in Advertising, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 18, 2010, at A10 [hereinafter Luo, Groups Push Legal Limits], available 
at 2010 WLNR 20808108 (noting that a post-Citizens United ad by the Ameri-
can Future Fund expressly advocating “Vote against Bobby Bright” would 
have been prohibited by prior limitations to “issue ads”); see also Luo, Changes, 
supra note 59 (“What Citizens United did was to ostensibly remove that re-
maining shackle of ‘issue advocacy.’”). For the precedential origin of the ex-
press advocacy test, see infra note 129 and accompanying text. Granted, such 
political communications can only be in the form of independent expenditures, 
and therefore cannot be coordinated with campaigns. Crow, supra note 3, at 3.  
 63. Editorial, Topic A: The Post Asked Political and Legal Experts to Ex-
plain Who Is Helped, and Who Is Hurt, By Last Week’s Supreme Court Deci-
sion, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2010, at A15 [hereinafter Who Is Helped or Hurt] 
(asking the opinions of nine experts).  
 64. Michael Booth, Vote’s Over; Ads Aren’t, DENVER POST, Nov. 14, 2010, 
at A01, available at 2010 WLNR 22793829.  
 65. Id.  
 66. 2010 Outside Spending, by Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www 
.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&disp=O&type=A& 
chrt=D (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). Other sources suggest similar overall to-
tals. See, e.g., Charles Kolb, It’s the Money, Stupid, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 
22, 2010, 12:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-kolb/its-the-money 
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United is clear: “[t]he use of undisclosed funds has skyrock-
eted.”67  
The amount of money coming from outside groups corre-
lated, largely, with winners and with Republicans. One com-
mentator observed that while “the biggest money doesn’t al-
ways win, . . . [it] does win more often than not.”68 For example, 
independent groups spent almost three times as much money 
on winning candidates.69 As a result, ads funded by wealthy 
and corporate donors tipped the balance in fifty-eight of seven-
ty-four congressional seats that changed parties.70 Conserva-
tive candidates benefited from a two-to-one independent ex-
penditure advantage.71 Significantly, of the more than $138 
million coming from outside nondisclosure groups—including 
§ 501(c)(4) nonprofits—over $120 million came from conserva-
tive organizations.72 
While it is not yet known how much of the total outside 
money came specifically from § 501(c)(4) entities, it is clear that 
they were the source of a vast amount of political dollars. One 
of the most successful social welfare nonprofits was Karl Rove’s 
Crossroads Grassroots Political Strategies (Crossroads GPS). 
Targeting resources on battleground races, all of Rove’s organi-
zations—including the American Crossroads PAC—reported 
spending nearly $39 million on outside expenditures, and still 
have significant war chests left over after raising more than 
 
-stupid_1_b_800268.html (“The counting is not yet over, but we do know that 
the recent midterm elections saw substantially more money spent on political 
campaigns than ever before in a nonpresidential election year, with some $135 
million spent in secret contributions by nonprofit groups to influence the elec-
tions.”). 
 67. Matt Viser, Donor Names Stay Secret as Nonprofits Politick, BOS. 
GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 19987068 (“During the 
2006 midterms, for example, 97 percent of groups taking out a broadcast ad 
just before an election disclosed the donors funding the ads. This year, fewer 
than a third have made such disclosures . . . .”).  
 68. Booth, supra note 64 (quoting Charlie Cook, editor of Cook’s Political 
Report).  
 69. See Taylor Lincoln, Outside Job: Winning Candidate Enjoyed Advan-
tage in Unregulated Third-Party Spending in 58 of 74 Party-Shifting Contests, 
PUB. CITIZEN, 3 (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Outside-Job 
-Report-20101103.pdf (“Winning candidates in elections in which power changed 
hands were aided by average spending of $764,326 by independent groups, 
while losing candidates were aided by average spending of $273,268 . . . .”). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Eliza Newlin Carney, Democratic Dilemma, NAT’L J. (D.C.), (Nov. 8, 
2010, 12:25 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/ 
progressives-face-tricky-question-20101108. 
 72. 2010 Outside Spending, by Groups, supra note 66. 
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$71 million from wealthy conservatives.73 Of these totals, Cross-
roads GPS raised $43 million and spent $17 million.74 Senator 
Patty Murray (D-Wash.) narrowly escaped defeat despite 
Rove’s group spending nearly $4 million in an attempt to take 
her down.75 In the forty-three contests that Crossroads GPS 
blanketed with outside money, twenty-eight of the candidates 
rode to victory.76  
While President Obama warned his party to stay away 
from these secretive organizations and their “funny money,” 
many on the left are looking to mimic Republican successes by 
collecting undisclosed contributions through their own social 
welfare nonprofits.77 Although the move is not popular with 
everyone,78 others warn that “to not play the game . . . would be 
self-defeating.”79 Unfortunately, the advantages of the 
§ 501(c)(4) loophole indicate that the outside spending problem 
will only be exacerbated in future elections.80 
II.  COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTERESTS AND 
REFORM OPTIONS   
While Part I demonstrated the basis for the § 501(c)(4) loop-
hole in the tax code and the reasons for its increasing preva-
lence among campaign finance entities, this Part makes the 
case for reform and develops possible options. The first section 
highlights the particular problems created by the use of 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations in politics and frames them as compel-
 
 73. Carney, supra note 71. Breaking down the near-$39 million total, 
Crossroads GPS spent $17,122,446 and American Crossroads spent 
$21,553,277. 2010 Outside Spending, by Groups, supra note 66. 
 74. Michael Beckel, Conservative Juggernaut American Crossroads Fi-
nished Election Season with Fund-Raising Flourish, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Dec. 2, 
2010, 11:20 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/12/american-crossroads 
-finished-electi.html. 
 75. Kyung M. Song, Murray a Top Target for Anonymous Cash, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A7, available at 2010 WL 22128301. Outside groups 
were more successful in President Obama’s old Senate seat, where they spent 
$4.4 million against Democratic candidate Alexi Giannoulias. Id. 
 76. Booth, supra note 64. 
 77. Carney, supra note 71; see also Lucy Madison, Liberal Donors Meeting 
to Strategize Fundraising Tactics for 2012, CBSNEWS.COM, Nov. 15, 2010, http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20022843-503544.html (discussing a re-
cent meeting of top liberal donors to plan campaign finance strategy for 2012). 
 78. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 58 (“It would be sad to see . . . Democrats 
. . . join the secret political donors’ gusher.”). 
 79. Id.  
 80. See Booth, supra note 64 (“[T]he noxious campaigns are on the verge 
of becoming perpetual and infinitely more expensive.”). 
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ling governmental interests allowing policymakers to take ac-
tion. The second section examines four possible means for elim-
inating or discouraging the § 501(c)(4) loophole and assesses 
each option’s political and jurisprudential viability. 
A. PROBLEMS WITH § 501(C)(4) NONPROFITS IN POLITICS 
The use of social welfare nonprofits raises a number of con-
cerning issues that could provide the government with grounds 
for regulation. Social welfare organizations allow donors to by-
pass hard-fought campaign finance reforms, denigrate the 
overall political message, and threaten the integrity of the 
democratic process. This exploitation further undermines legit-
imacy and public faith in the nonprofit sector. This section 
highlights seven key problems with § 501(c)(4) nonprofits in 
politics. 
First, the entities allow wealthy donors to circumvent indi-
vidual contribution limits. In a Fox News interview, Karl Rove 
explicitly appealed to wealthy donors: “[I]f you’ve maxed out 
the to [sic] senatorial committee, the congressional committee 
or the RNC and would like to do more, under the Citizens Unit-
ed [sic] decisions, you can give money to . . . Crossroads GPS.”81 
This runs antithetical to the history and purpose of social wel-
fare nonprofits.  
Second, donors also dodge campaign finance reforms be-
cause they can donate an unlimited amount of money to non-
profit § 501(c)(4) entities. This feature tends to advantage spe-
cial interests at the expense of candidate committees. For 
example, a former FEC chairman envisioned a post-Citizens 
United scenario in which interest groups could solicit a quarter-
of-a-million dollars through a single wealthy donor and unleash 
a slew of attack ads in the waning days of a campaign, forcing 
the targeted candidate into an impossible position that would 
require finding 100 donors willing to give the maximum just to 
adequately respond.82 
Third, transparency in the democratic process suffers from 
the use of § 501(c)(4) groups. One tax scholar has noted that the 
lack of disclosure requirements is likely the chief draw of do-
 
 81. Complaint, Crossroads G.P.S., supra note 9, at 14 (quoting Alex Seitz-
Wald, Rove Admits His ‘Shadow RNC’ Attack Group Functions Largely Be-
cause of the Citizens United Decision, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (July 6, 2010, 6:15 
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/2010/07/06/rove-citizens-united-crossroads). 
 82. Who Is Helped or Hurt, supra note 63 (citing Robert Lenhard, former 
chairman of the FEC). 
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nors to social welfare nonprofits.83 Yet this lack of disclosure 
leaves citizens in the dark as to the funding sources of adver-
tisements—as well as their motivations.84 Entities sometimes 
“intentionally mislead voters by using patriotic or populist 
sounding names” despite corporate funding.85 This not only 
harms traditional elections, but also has dire consequences for 
ballot initiatives, referendum elections,86 and judicial races.87 
Based on one of the Supreme Court’s rationales for upholding 
disclosure requirements, voters should have access to informa-
tion indicating “‘where political campaign money comes from’” 
to aid in their election-time evaluations.88 For § 501(c)(4) organ-
izations, then, the lack of disclosure is both harmful to the 
democratic process and symptomatic of many other problems. 
Fourth, outside money often causes modern elections to be-
come even more negative and ugly.89 Lack of disclosure results 
in “the roughest and most misleading ads, because [interest 
groups] are not accountable to local leaders or shamed by bad 
publicity.”90 As a result, they are willing to cross lines that few 
candidates would dare to approach.91 
 
 83. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 8, at 309 (“Achieving deductibility for 
contributors seems less important than the ability to accept contributions from 
any sources without limitation while at the same time avoiding disclosure.” 
(quoting Frances R. Hill, Softer Money: Exempt Organizations and Campaign 
Finance, 32 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 27, 43 (2001))). 
 84. Viser, supra note 67; see also McManus, supra note 5 (“Voters deserve 
to know who’s paying for campaign commercials, on both sides, even if an ad 
isn’t directly coordinated by the candidate who benefits from it.”). 
 85. Garrett & Smith, supra note 8, at 305; see also Richard Briffault, 
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 289 (2010) (noting 
that many groups take on “names often suggestive of an interest or ideology 
quite different from that of their principal backers—‘Citizens for Better Medi-
care,’ ‘Republicans for Clean Air’—or simply sounding patriotic or populist 
themes—‘Citizens for a Sound Economy,’ ‘Of the People’”). 
 86. Briffault, supra note 85, at 296–97. 
 87. See Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The En-
dangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1247 (2008) (“In many states, a [judicial] can-
didate can be given secret support by contributions to ‘stealth PACs’ like 527s 
and 501(c)(4)s.”). 
 88. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1976) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-
564, at 4 (1971)). 
 89. See Daniel, supra note 19, at 182 n.243 (citing Richard Hasen for the 
proposition that, unlike political parties, outside groups are more inclined to 
run negative ads). 
 90. Booth, supra note 64. 
 91. Ezra Klein, More Money, More Problems: The Soul-Crushing Life of a 
Senator, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 2010, at 23 (“[I]deological hit groups that delight 
in the scurrilous attacks that candidates themselves would never make.”). 
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Fifth, the nature of the tax-exempt organization leads to a 
number of temporal concerns. Many § 501(c)(4) organizations 
open up shop just a few months before election day, so to avoid 
any kind of tax reporting until late in the season.92 For exam-
ple, a group known as the 60 Plus Association has “been filing 
with the [IRS] based on a fiscal year, instead of the calendar 
year, so it may have until July 2011 to get its ledgers in or-
der.”93 FEC reporting dates for independent expenditure re-
ports also mean that the full impact of § 501(c)(4) groups will 
not be known until at least the December 31st after an election, 
if not later.94 
Sixth, the use of nonprofits can and does result in coordi-
nation with political parties and candidates, or at least the ap-
pearance of coordination. This makes a mockery out of at-
tempts by these groups to claim that their activities are 
“independent expenditures.”95 One example of such coordina-
tion, Americans for Job Security—a business league organized 
under § 501(c)(6) of the tax code—sublet its office space from 
Karl Rove’s Crossroads Media, which boasted the RNC and the 
Republican Governors Association as clients.96 These organiza-
tions seem to have revolving doors with political parties, con-
sulting groups, candidates, and elected officials.97 In one in-
stance, a Crossroads director formerly served as one of 
President George W. Bush’s political directors.98  
Seventh, the use of nonprofits can and does result in cor-
ruption, or at least the appearance of corruption. Wealthy do-
nors are motivated to contribute large sums of money to buy 
 
 92. Daniel, supra note 19, at 176. 
 93. Luo, Groups Push Legal Limits, supra note 62, at A13. The 60 Plus 
Association purports to be the conservative answer to AARP. Id.  
 94. Song, supra note 75. 
 95. See supra note 62; see also Luo, Groups Push Legal Limits, supra note 
62 (“[A]t least two major Republican-leaning groups . . . have now devoted 
more than half of their spending this year on television advertising for express 
advocacy.”). 
 96. Mike McIntire, Under Tax-Exempt Cloak, Political Dollars Flow, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WL 18994156. 
 97. See id. (“It is sometimes hard to discern the boundaries separating 
Americans for Job Security from the consultants in its office suite and the in-
terests of their Republican clients.”). 
 98. Id.; see also Letter from Melanie Sloan, Exec. Dir., Citizens for Re-
sponsibility & Ethics in Wash., to Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal 
Revenue Serv. (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
47975763/2-1-2011-AFF-IRS-Letter (drawing attention to the partisan ties of 
the American Future Fund, including the fact that the organization’s presi-
dent also serves as a Republican state senator).  
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access to elected officials, and anonymous donors hope to “pur-
chase the votes that will make them richer.”99 Because 
§ 501(c)(4) nonprofits have no disclosure requirements, “there 
will be no check on the corruptive influence of large campaign 
contribution[s] and our democracy will surely suffer.”100 David 
Cobb, the Green Party’s presidential nominee in 2008, opines 
that the Supreme Court allows for the “corporate bribery of our 
elected officials,”101 and another commentator worries that 
“we’re returning to the bad old days when powerful interests 
could buy politicians without any way to trace it.”102 Many are 
troubled by the proposition that “[t]he U.S. is due for a huge 
scandal involving big money, bribery and politicians.”103 
Whether these concerns are based in reality or merely fueled by 
cynicism, money funneled through nonprofits creates the im-
pression that our elected officials are bought and paid for.  
B. SEALING THE PIPES: REGULATING § 501(C)(4) 
ORGANIZATIONS 
While the problems with the § 501(c)(4) loophole are easy 
to recognize, developing a solution provides a much more com-
plicated challenge. This section explores current efforts to regu-
late § 501(c)(4) organizations and analyzes the potential effec-
tiveness and constitutionality of these and other reform 
options. 
1. The Obvious Starting Point: IRS Regulation 
Since § 501(c)(4) entities are tax-exempt organizations, it 
makes sense to look first to the IRS for some sort of regulatory 
fix.104 It is, after all, a Treasury Regulation that stipulates that 
electoral politics does not constitute social welfare.105 Looking 
to IRS regulation of § 501(c)(4) nonprofits may also be more po-
 
 99. Klein, supra note 91, at 23. Writing of the status quo, Klein says: “Pity 
our democracy, yes. But pity our politicians, too.” Id.  
 100. Donald B. Tobin, The Rise of 501(c)(4)s in Campaign Activity: Are They 
as Clever as They Think?, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Oct. 5, 2010), http:// 
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=7667. 
 101. Crow, supra note 3, at 3. 
 102. Jonathan Alter, Back to the ‘Bagman,’ NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 2010, at 45. 
 103. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 104. See Viser, supra note 67 (“[T]he IRS is the primary overseer of such 
nonprofit groups.”). 
 105. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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litically feasible than taking legislative action.106 Because the 
Republicans now control the U.S. House of Representatives, 
President Obama will likely need to push reforms through ex-
ecutive action.107 As noted above, § 501(c)(4) nonprofits are es-
sentially beholden to the “primary purpose” test where political 
activities must account for less than half of their overall func-
tions.108 For many § 501(c)(4) organizations in the last election, 
it would be a “Herculean task” to argue that most of their ads 
are nonpolitical.109 Because there is “no opt-out provision” for 
the classification of political organizations, the IRS has the 
power to reclassify an entity that claims to be a § 501(c)(4) non-
profit but acts like a § 527 political organization as such.110 
Upon making this determination, the IRS could force disclosure 
and assess penalties.111 Other options at the IRS’s disposal to 
dissuade large donors from § 501(c)(4) nonprofits include charg-
ing gift taxes to donors,112 or increasing registration and disclo-
sure requirements similar to those that exist for § 527 
groups.113  
Enforcement through the IRS has already gained traction 
in Congress. In September, the Chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee penned a letter to the IRS requesting in-
vestigation into the political activities of many nonprofits, in-
cluding § 501(c)(4) entities, to determine whether tax-exempt 
 
 106. Dan Froomkin, Obama Can Pursue Ambitious Agenda Without Con-
gress’s Help, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/03/obama-can-pursue-busy-age_n_778583.html. 
 107. Id. (“There’s zero chance a Republican House is going to limit money 
in politics. But Obama on his own could roll back some of the excesses of the 
2010 election.”). 
 108. Viser, supra note 67. However, many lawyers have stated that “the 
I.R.S. has never explicitly ruled that 50 percent is the official limit for political 
spending,” and that the number “could, in fact, be less. . . . The crucial ques-
tion is how a group’s ‘primary purpose’ is evaluated.” Luo, Groups Push Legal 
Limits, supra note 62, at A10. 
 109. Luo, Groups Push Legal Limits, supra note 62, at A10. 
 110. Tobin, supra note 100. 
 111. Froomkin, supra note 106; see also Luo, Groups Push Legal Limits, 
supra note 62, at A10 (“Problems with the I.R.S. could lead to tax penalties 
and revocation of tax-exempt status.”).  
 112. See Aprill, supra note 14, at 56 (observing that while the stated posi-
tion of the IRS is to apply the gift tax to contributions made to § 501(c)(4) non-
profits, there have been no recent indications of enforcement); Tobin, supra 
note 100 (“While there is a statutory exemption from the gift tax for contribu-
tions to (c)(3) and 527 organizations, there is no such exemption for (c)(4)s.”).  
 113. See Aprill, supra note 14, at 90–96 (proposing a myriad of regulatory 
options through the IRS).  
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status should be revoked.114 The letter asked: “Is the tax code 
being used to eliminate transparency in the funding of our elec-
tions—elections that are the constitutional bedrock of our de-
mocracy?”115 In addition to the “primary purpose” test, Senator 
Max Baucus (D-Mont.) raised concerns that nonprofits were 
failing to make required notifications to their members regard-
ing political activities, and that they violated the code by allow-
ing benefits to advance private interests.116 Republicans re-
sponded with accusations of unfair politicization, arguing that 
“audits and investigations are specifically intended to be sepa-
rated from the political process.”117 
However, specific regulations for § 501(c)(4) entities do 
have a number of drawbacks. First, a timing problem exists be-
cause the IRS cannot feasibly regulate social welfare nonprofits 
until after they file tax returns.118 Second, organizations 
formed explicitly for electoral purposes can seek to avoid the 
fifty percent rule by ramping up spending on nonpolitical ad-
vertising after the elections.119 Crossroads GPS still has mil-
lions of dollars in the bank to spend on issue ads regarding 
“pending policy fights over taxes, health care and climate is-
sues,”120 and groups have already flooded the airwaves with 
similar ads in order to increase the numbers on the nonpolitical 
 
 114. See Letter from Max Baucus, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., to Doug-
las H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (Sept. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.politico.com/static/PPM176_100929_irs.html. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B) (2010) provides the crucial prerequisite: “[N]o 
part of the net earnings of [501(c)(4)s can inure] to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual.” 
 117. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Republicans See a Political Motive in I.R.S. 
Audits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, at A26, available at 2010 WL 19996323 
(quoting Senators Orrin Hatch and Jon Kyl); see also Allison Hayward, Baucus 
Sics IRS on Political Nonprofits, Cites Influence of Conservative Groups, 
EXAMINER (Oct. 7, 2010, 11:00 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/ 
blogs/examiner-opinion-zone/Baucus-sics-irs-political-nonprofits-cites-influence 
-conservative-groups (“No one today is willing to defend the abusive tactics of 
Nixon, Johnson or Roosevelt in investigating their political opponents through 
IRS manipulation. Perhaps we can we agree, then, to unite in outrage against 
their modern-day cohorts?”). 
 118. McManus, supra note 5; see also supra notes 92–94 and accompanying 
text. 
 119. See Luo, Groups Push Legal Limits, supra note 62, at A10 
(“[501(c)(4)s] may, for example, broadcast a lot of advertisements during the 
lame-duck Congress.”). 
 120. Carney, supra note 71. 
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side of their ledgers.121 Third, disclosure does not seem to be a 
part of the mission of the IRS since it “cares if you pay your 
taxes,” but “does not care so much about transparency.”122 Fi-
nally, regulating specific tax-exempt entities rather than politi-
cal speech “merely encourages organizations to seek out an al-
ternative entity for their speech.”123 Although IRS regulation is 
possibly more feasible in the current political climate, it may 
not provide the best approach for limiting the political activities 
of § 501(c)(4) organizations. As a result, campaign finance regu-
lation may prove to be a more comprehensive and effective so-
lution.124 
2. Hardening the Money: Section 501(c)(4) Groups as Political 
Committees Under the FEC 
Another way to regulate § 501(c)(4) groups is to call a 
spade a spade and treat political nonprofits as political commit-
tees under the regulatory authority of the FEC. This was the 
method applied to § 527 entities,125 and has gained traction 
with recent FEC legal filings. Such treatment would subject so-
cial welfare nonprofits to registration requirements, contribu-
tion limits, and disclosures since “‘[p]olitical committee’ status 
is the linchpin of most campaign finance law restrictions.”126  
In order to bring § 501(c)(4) nonprofits within the ambit of 
the FEC, the “major purpose” of the nonprofit must be to en-
gage in political campaigning.127 This distinction originated 
with Buckley v. Valeo, where the Supreme Court held that the 
term “political committee” in FECA “encompass[es] organiza-
 
 121. See Booth, supra note 64 (“Scranton-area residents are now seeing ge-
neric attack ads warning against global-warming legislation and looser labor 
laws . . . . Groups seeking to keep 501(c) tax-exempt status are required to 
show spending on ‘education’ besides elections, so they will likely increase off-
year ads informing voters about legislation and issues . . . .”). 
 122. Jeff A. Taylor, Call for Disclosing 501 Donors Runs Afoul of IRS Regu-
lations, LINCOLN TRIB., Nov. 2, 2010, http://lincolntribune.com/?p=466 (quota-
tion omitted). 
 123. Tobin, supra note 13, at 99. 
 124. Aprill, supra note 14, at 8 (providing detailed recommendations for 
regulating the political activity of noncharitable exempt organizations such as 
§ 501(c)(4) entities, but conceding that “tax law regulation cannot substitute 
for campaign finance regulation”). 
 125. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., SUPPLEMENT, supra note 26, at 67 (noting 
that some 527 organizations could be regulated as political committees based 
on the “major purpose” test); supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 126. Ryan, supra note 18, at 471–72; see also 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 433, 434, 441 
(2006). 
 127. Luo, Changes, supra note 59, at A13. 
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tions that are under the control of a candidate or the major 
purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candi-
date.”128 Over time, the Court has narrowed its application of 
the major purpose test to “express advocacy.”129  
A nonprofit organization known as Public Citizen recently 
filed complaints with the FEC to classify Crossroads GPS and 
American Future Fund as political committees.130 The com-
plaints argue that a group’s “self-proclaimed tax status” does 
not determine its major purpose131 and that the FEC has mis-
applied an “express advocacy” requirement to the major pur-
pose test.132 The complaints rely on the statutory definition of 
political committee, which requires registration for any group 
receiving contributions or making expenditures over $1000 dur-
ing a calendar year, and further defines “expenditure” as an 
amount made “for the purpose of influencing any election for 
Federal office.”133 Based on this language, Public Citizen con-
tends that that the major purpose test should apply to any or-
ganization that spends money to influence an election, regard-
less of whether expenditures are for “express advocacy.”134 
Under this interpretation, many more groups—including politi-
cally active § 501(c)(4) nonprofits—would be subject to the 
campaign finance regulatory requirements of registration and 
disclosure. This argument finds some support in federal juris-
prudence that has questioned the current regulatory frame-
 
 128. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). See generally Ryan, supra note 
18, at 481–82 (detailing the history of the test); Daniel, supra note 19, at 165 
(discussing the “major purpose” test to determine political committee status). 
 129. See Ryan, supra note 18, at 500. “Express advocacy” relates to the 
“magic words” test in Buckley. 424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (“[E]xpress words of advoca-
cy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ 
‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”). 
 130. Complaint at 1–3, Pub. Citizen v. Am. Future Fund (F.E.C. Oct. 12, 
2010) [hereinafter Complaint, Am. Future Fund], available at http://www.citizen 
.org/documents/FEC_Final_Complaint_AmericanFutureFund101510.pdf; Com-
plaint, Crossroads G.P.S., supra note 9.  
 131. Complaint, Crossroads G.P.S., supra note 9, at 7. 
 132. Id. at 9. 
 133. Id. at 5 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 431(4), (8)(A) (2006)); see also Complaint, 
Am. Future Fund, supra note 130, at 8 (citing similar language). 
 134. Complaint, Crossroads G.P.S., supra note 9, at 8; cf. Ryan, supra note 
18, at 484–85 (“[W]hen 527 organizations spend money ‘for the purpose of in-
fluencing’ federal elections—regardless of whether or not they engage in ex-
press advocacy—such organizations should be deemed to fall within the feder-
al statutory definition of ‘political committee.’”).  
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work adhered to by the FEC.135 While the outcome of these cas-
es will probably not be known for some time, the likely scenario 
is grim unless the composition of the FEC changes. Currently, 
the six-member commission is stuck in partisan deadlock, and 
the three Republican members are unlikely to rule against 
groups like Crossroads GPS.136 
The other possible method for classifying § 501(c)(4) groups 
as political committees is to bring their ads within the new def-
inition of a “coordinated communication”137 under the BCRA 
such that ads run for or against candidates—but not directly 
coordinated with any campaign—would still be considered con-
tributions rather than independent expenditures. The FEC re-
cently adopted the “functional equivalent” standard, effective 
December 1, 2010, which provides that “a communication is the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy if it is susceptible of 
no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for 
or against a clearly identified Federal candidate.”138 This stand-
ard originated in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin 
Right to Life, Inc., where the Court held that ads instructing 
citizens to call their senators and tell them to oppose a filibus-
ter on judicial nominees were not the “functional equivalent” of 
express advocacy because they looked like issue ads, they did 
not mention a candidate, and they took no position on a candi-
date’s electoral qualifications.139 The Court again applied the 
test in Citizens United, but this time found that a documentary 
entitled Hillary: The Movie was the functional equivalent of ex-
press advocacy.140 The application of this test will materialize 
over time. It is possible that members of the FEC could apply a 
very narrow reading of the “no reasonable interpretation” lan-
 
 135. Complaint, Crossroads G.P.S., supra note 9, at 9 (citing the “FEC’s 
Misinterpretation of Buckley” section in Shays v. FEC, 511 F. Supp. 2d 19, 26–
27 (D.D.C. 2007)). 
 136. Luo, Changes, supra note 59, at A13; see also Richard L. Hasen, The 
FEC Is as Good as Dead, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.slate.com/id/ 
2282257/ (noting that the three-to-three bipartisan gridlock on the FEC is 
“business as usual,” and that “[f ]or the past several years the three Republi-
can FEC commissioners have blocked enforcement of much of what remains of 
federal campaign finance law”).  
 137. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2006). 
 138. Coordinated Communications, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,947, 55,952 (Sept. 15, 
2010) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 109). 
 139. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 459, 469–70 (2007). 
 140. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 890 (2010) (“[T]here is no rea-
sonable interpretation of Hillary other than as an appeal to vote against Sena-
tor Clinton.”). 
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guage. Again, the current makeup of the commission indicates 
that plaintiffs will have a hard time arguing for regulation ab-
sent blatant coordination.141  
3. Maximum Contribution Limits for Individual Donors 
One solution to the outside money problem lies in over-
turning the ban on expenditure limits.142 Although the Court 
thought in 1976 that independent advocacy did “not presently 
appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption compara-
ble to those identified with large campaign contributions,”143 
the time has come to revisit this conclusion.144 However, the 
current balance of the Court disagrees.145 Nevertheless, there 
may be another way to control nonprofit conduits for political 
dollars. Since § 501(c)(4) organizations are clearly set up as 
loopholes to circumvent FECA’s maximum contribution lim-
its,146 another solution could be to apply an overall cap on indi-
vidual contributions to social welfare nonprofits.  
Such an approach would certainly be an uphill battle, es-
pecially given the recent D.C. Circuit opinion in Speechnow.org 
v. Federal Election Commission.147 That case struck down the 
$5000 individual contribution limit for individuals donating to 
PACs that only make independent expenditures.148 The deci-
sion was predicated on Citizens United’s conclusion that “inde-
 
 141. See Hasen, supra note 136 (“As we enter the 2012 election season, the 
FEC is as good as dead, and the already troubling campaign finance world of 
secret unlimited donations is bound to get worse.”). 
 142. This view is shared by many others. See, e.g., David Schultz, Revisit-
ing Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between Candidate and Independ-
ent Expenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 33 (1998).  
 143. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (emphasis added). 
 144. “[E]ven if the Buckley Court was correct in 1976 that money spent for 
independent advocacy did not then appear to pose the threat of real or appar-
ent corruption, it certainly [did] by 1998,” Schultz, supra note 142, at 36, and 
in light of the evidence presented in this Note, it absolutely does in 2011. 
 145. See Hasen, supra note 61, at 617 (lamenting the Court’s “incoherent” 
approach on the varied evidentiary standards for corruption needed to justify 
contribution—as opposed to spending—limitations); David Schultz, Buckley v. 
Valeo, Randall v. Sorrell, and the Future of Campaign Finance on the Roberts 
Court, 123 NEXUS 153, 174 (2007) (“At least five Justices would continue to 
apply Buckley, at least in some manner, to future cases . . . .”). 
 146. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
 147. Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010). 
 148. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., SUPPLEMENT, supra note 26, at 67; see also 
Carney, supra note 71 (discussing the future possibilities for “super PACs”). 
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pendent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do 
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”149  
However, the Supreme Court cannot conclude that an in-
dependent expenditure will never give rise to corruption; such a 
conclusion is plainly one of fact and not of law. Moreover, 
Speechnow.org seems to conflate Buckley’s basic distinction be-
tween contribution limits and expenditure limits. If wealthy 
individuals want to make their own expenditures, current juris-
prudence allows them to do so in the name of political speech, 
but the government’s interest in preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption could provide support for a maximum 
contribution limit.150 Relying on Buckley’s rationale, it could be 
argued that the act of donating to § 501(c)(4) groups is, in and 
of itself, the free speech act, and contributions can thus be lim-
ited because such limitation is only a “marginal restriction” on 
free speech.151 The “expression rests solely on the undifferen-
tiated, symbolic act of contributing,” not on the quantity of the 
contribution.152 It should be noted that such limits, if upheld, 
would bolster the government’s interest in requiring disclosure 
because recordkeeping, disclosure, and reporting requirements 
give the government the ability to detect violations of contribu-
tion limits.153 
4. Legislative Action: Requiring Disclosure of § 501(c)(4) 
Donors 
The final option for successful campaign finance reform 
seems to come in the form supported by virtually everyone: dis-
closure.154 Numerous public opinion polls show that citizens are 
deeply concerned with the role of money in politics,155 and a 
 
 149. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010). 
 150. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (“[W]e 
recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending 
to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributors.”); see also DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 795 (4th ed. 2008) (noting that McConnell v. FEC de-
fined corruption as “access”—“[e]ven if that access did not secure actual influ-
ence, [because] it certainly gave the ‘appearance of such influence.’” (quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 151. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976).  
 152. Id. at 21. 
 153. Id. at 67–68. 
 154. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 8, at 295 (“Disclosure elicits fairly 
widespread support; those who oppose contribution or expenditure limits are 
often willing to support disclose statutes.”). 
 155. Carney, supra note 71. 
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large majority of voters want to know who is bankrolling politi-
cal ads.156  
In the last session of Congress, the Democracy Is Strength-
ened by Casting Light On Spending In Elections Act 
(DISCLOSE Act) was introduced by congressional Demo-
crats.157 That legislation would have expressly required non-
profits to disclose all contributions and expenditures over 
$1000, and to disclaim their top five corporate contributors.158 
The Act’s requirements generally applied to § 501(c)(4) entities, 
but an exemption existed if a social welfare nonprofit had more 
than 500,000 dues-paying members with representation in all 
fifty states, D.C., and Puerto Rico, the organization only re-
ceived fifteen percent of its revenue from corporations and la-
bor unions, and it did not spend any of that money on cam-
paign-related activity.159  
The DISCLOSE Act passed the House in June of 2010, but 
died in the Senate a month later on a party-line vote.160 One 
commentator has cautioned that absent passage of the Act, or 
similar disclosure legislation, “the 2012 campaign will be about 
as transparent as a Chinese sovereign-wealthfund.”161 
III.  SHINING LIGHT ON POLITICAL MONEY FUNNELED 
THROUGH SOCIAL WELFARE NONPROFITS   
The previous Part developed the need for regulation and 
initially explored some potential options for reform. However, 
many of these options have their own drawbacks that diminish 
their respective chances of successful regulation. As a result, 
this Part makes the case for disclosure and disclaimer require-
ments as the best possible option for reforming the nefarious 
usage of the § 501(c)(4) campaign finance loophole.  
 
 156. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 58 (“An ABC News/Washington Post poll 
indicates that three-fourths of registered voters think it is ‘very’ or ‘somewhat 
important’ for them to know who is paying the freight for these political non-
profits and their campaign ads.”). 
 157. H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010). Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and 
Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), created a website explaining the legislation and en-
couraging citizens to “co-sponsor” the Act. See WE WANT THE DISCLOSE ACT, 
http://www.discloseact.com/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).  
 158. H.R. 5175; Crow, supra note 3, at 5. 
 159. H.R. 5175, § 211(c). 
 160. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 143, 172 n.179 (2010). 
 161. Alter, supra note 102, at 45; see also id. (“Without reform, a flood of 
undisclosed money could swamp Obama in 2012 and send even more Demo-
crats into retirement.”). 
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It is true that disclosure could be accomplished through 
some of the other options previously discussed. For example, in 
addition to enforcing current regulations, the IRS could also 
add stronger rules to specifically regulate the political activity 
of social welfare nonprofits. For example, disclosure provisions 
could be added for § 501(c)(4) nonprofits similar to those that 
exist for § 527 groups.162 Regulating § 501(c)(4) groups as polit-
ical organizations or mandating contribution caps for nonprofit 
donations would also result in disclosure requirements. Howev-
er, IRS regulation may be neither feasible nor successful,163 
and the FEC is mired in gridlock, making the regulation of 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations under current federal election law a 
virtual impossibility.164 Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
struck down expenditure limits, and in some cases, even con-
tribution limits involving independent expenditures.165 
Despite the difficulties surrounding the passage of legisla-
tion—particularly in the current Congress where the Republi-
cans control the House and the Democrats control the Senate—
disclosure legislation may be the most politically feasible op-
tion.166 This is true for two reasons. First, disclosure has broad-
based support among the public.167 Second, and perhaps more 
important in the current political climate, conservatives gener-
ally support disclosure requirements.168 
 
 162. See Tobin, supra note 100 (noting that this was part of the original 
legislation). 
 163. See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 165. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 166. See, e.g., Kolb, supra note 66 (“[G]iven the Republicans’ enormous suc-
cesses on virtually every level – the House, the Senate, the governorships, 
state legislatures, and even state judicial races – it will be virtually impossible 
for basic reforms to pass the Congress before 2012, with the exception of the 
new disclosure provisions that nearly passed this year.” (emphasis added)). 
 167. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; see also Briffault, supra 
note 85, at 274 (“Disclosure generally gets high marks from the public, aca-
demics, and the courts. Opinion polls find very high levels of public support for 
campaign finance disclosure.”); Megan R. Wilson, Groups Fight to Put 
DISCLOSE Back on the Senate Floor, Face Resistance, OPENSECRETS.ORG 
(Nov. 18, 2010, 4:17 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/groups 
-fight-to-put-disclose-back-o.html (“72 percent of Americans are concerned that 
outside groups don’t have to disclose the funders behind their ads.”). 
 168. See Briffault, supra note 85, at 274, 286 & n.107 (mentioning Republi-
can backing in Congress as well as libertarian support for disclosure); Kolb, 
supra note 66 (noting conservative George Will’s support for the “‘sunlight is 
the best disinfectant’ approach”); Who Is Helped or Hurt, supra note 63 (quot-
ing a former GOP White House staffer advocating to “remove the limits and 
disclose everything. That way everyone gets a fair shot”). 
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Constitutionally, disclosure requirements appear to be the 
safest option for withstanding a legal challenge. Disclosure 
avoids the complex constitutional questions raised by the 
Court’s jurisprudence on contribution and expenditure lim-
its.169 Disclosure requirements could, however, be constitution-
ally challenged based on the free speech interests of members 
developed in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.170 In that 
case, the NAACP challenged Alabama’s requirement that the 
organization disclose the names and addresses of all its mem-
bers to the state Attorney General.171 The Court pointed out 
that “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in 
advocacy may constitute [an] effective . . . restraint on freedom 
of association,” and as a result, it struck down the membership-
list disclosure requirement on grounds that it violated First 
Amendment associational freedom, as incorporated to the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.172 The Court reasoned that disclosure of the 
membership lists might discourage individuals from joining the 
organization out of fear of harassment or other retribution.173 
The Court applies exacting scrutiny to disclosure require-
ments due to the potential First Amendment associational 
rights implications, requiring disclosures to have a “relevant 
correlation” with, or a “substantial relation” to, the govern-
ment’s interests.174 It is true that when challengers to FECA’s 
disclosure requirements attempted to argue a distinction be-
tween members and contributors, the Buckley Court refused to 
“draw fine lines between contributors and members,” but rath-
er treated them “interchangeably.”175 However, a membership-
based challenge would still likely fail because well-crafted dis-
closure legislation would only require disclosure of some donors 
 
 169. See Briffault, supra note 85, at 273 (“Disclosure is viewed as a means 
of discouraging potentially corrupting practices without having to resolve the 
knotty questions of which contributions and expenditures are corrupting or 
even what corruption means in the campaign finance context.”); supra note 
145 and accompanying text. 
 170. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). For a gen-
eral discussion of this case and other cases dealing with the “right to anonymi-
ty” in the disclosure and disclaimer context, see Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens 
Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy 
in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 646–50 (2010). 
 171. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 463. 
 174. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976). 
 175. Id. 
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who have aggregate contributions over a certain threshold 
amount, but not all members of the nonprofit entity.176  
Disclosure has been supported by the Supreme Court be-
cause it improves voter confidence in the electoral process, pre-
vents corruption or the appearance of corruption, aids in the 
enforcement of contribution limits, and allows voters to com-
pletely evaluate candidates.177 Petitioners would likely argue 
that the government’s interest is diminished in situations in-
volving donations to outside groups rather than to candidates. 
However, in the case of § 501(c)(4) nonprofits, all of these and 
other compelling governmental interests exist.178 Additionally, 
the government has an interest in detecting abuse of the tax-
exempt status, and disclosure would certainly aid that 
process.179 Furthermore, the Buckley Court specifically noted 
that the informational interest applies with equal force to un-
coordinated independent expenditures.180 These interests di-
rectly relate to disclosure of contributors—not full member 
lists. Because disclosure and disclaimer requirements bear a 
“relevant correlation” and a “substantial relation” to the gov-
ernment’s interests, they would likely survive constitutional 
scrutiny.  
Moreover, the Buckley Court held that while disclosure re-
quirements might deter some individuals from contributing 
and subject others to harassment or retaliation, disclosure re-
quirements usually “appear to be the least restrictive means of 
curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption.”181 
With respect to the DISCLOSE Act,182 the government could 
argue that the exemption for large nonprofits proves that the 
Act is narrowly tailored because it would lessen the burden on 
legitimate national § 501(c)(4) groups while requiring disclo-
sure from any entity set up by a few millionaires seeking to in-
 
 176. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 177. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 150, at 913; Briffault, supra note 85, 
at 280; Garrett & Smith, supra note 8, at 296–99; cf. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 
2811, 2819–20 (2010) (upholding disclosure requirements for the preservation 
of electoral integrity without addressing the government’s interest in provid-
ing information to the electorate). 
 178. See supra Part II.A (detailing the harms of § 501(c)(4) organizations in 
politics). 
 179. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley and 
disclosure). 
 180. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81. 
 181. Id. at 68. 
 182. See supra Part II.B.4. 
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fluence elections. The $1000 threshold in that legislation pro-
vides further evidence of narrow tailoring and safeguards as-
sociational rights of both smaller donors and nondonating 
members.183 
Disclosure has emerged as the reform tool standing on the 
safest constitutional ground. Citizens United upheld disclaimer 
and disclosure requirements based on the public’s interest in 
“knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an 
election.”184 The Court values “transparency” because it 
“enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give 
proper weight to different speakers and messages.”185 While 
compelled disclosure “may burden the ability to speak,” the 
Court reasoned that such requirements “do not prevent anyone 
from speaking.”186 Even if petitioners had actual evidence to 
prove egregious harms amounting to a chilling of speech caused 
by compelled disclosure, language similar to that in the 
DISCLOSE Act would insulate any disclosure legislation from 
challenge based on a provision waiving disclosure requirements 
where there is “reasonable probability that the disclosure of the 
information would subject the person to threats, harassments, 
or reprisals.”187 
Based on this constitutional analysis, it is clear that the 
DISCLOSE Act provides a sound model for withstanding a le-
gal challenge. Although Congress failed to pass the Act in its 
last session, Congressional leadership should continue to move 
forward with this crucial campaign finance legislation. In order 
to survive constitutional scrutiny, all future legislation should 
focus on contributors—not members—and should include pro-
visions such as the $1000 donor threshold and the waiver for 
harassment.  
Aside from being politically and constitutionally feasible, 
disclosure requirements discourage the political exploitation of 
§ 501(c)(4) entities.188 Many supporters of disclosure legislation 
believe it is necessary in order to “strip away the anonymity of 
 
 183. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. For a general discussion 
relating to privacy concerns of smaller donors, see William McGeveran, Mrs. 
McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2003).  
 184. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).  
 185. Id. at 916. 
 186. Id. at 914; see also Sullivan, supra note 160, at 172–74 (discussing the 
disclosure and disclaimer implications from Citizens United). 
 187. H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 402 (2010). 
 188. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
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outside groups.”189 Although disclosure and disclaimer legisla-
tion would not rein in the unlimited contributions that 
§ 501(c)(4) entities can currently collect, it would limit the non-
profit’s attractable qualities to wealthy donors who wish to re-
main anonymous.190 
  CONCLUSION   
When Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code in 
1913 to create tax-exempt social welfare organizations, it could 
not have predicted the campaign finance loophole that came to 
dominate the 2010 midterms. In fact, the IRS has expressly 
stated that social welfare does not encompass political activity, 
and a tax exemption did not emerge for political activity until 
the creation of § 527 political organizations in 1974. Nonethe-
less, savvy campaign financiers will continue to seek out cracks 
in the pipes given the Supreme Court’s warning that “[m]oney, 
like water, will always find an outlet.”191 This time around, po-
litical operatives have shown the promise of the § 501(c)(4) 
nonprofit. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent election law 
jurisprudence, one might be tempted to throw her hands in the 
air and argue that absent a constitutional amendment “affirm-
ing Congress’s power to regulate elections,”192 all hope is lost. 
However, this Note has attempted to demonstrate that multiple 
avenues exist for possible campaign finance reforms, and that 
these options have the legal support to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. Regulation of § 501(c)(4) groups through the IRS, the 
FEC, contribution caps, and disclosure legislation is vital, and 
all of these efforts should be attempted as soon as possible. Par-
 
 189. Song, supra note 75; see also Booth, supra note 64 (citing support for a 
“Surgeon General’s warning” on political ads). 
 190. Arguably, those individuals that do contribute large sums should 
“stand up in public for their political acts” and demonstrate “civic courage, 
without which democracy is doomed.” Briffault, supra note 85, at 294 (quoting 
Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 191. Holman, supra note 6, at 244 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 
619, 707 (2003)). 
 192. See Crow, supra note 3, at 4 (noting just such an amendment, pro-
posed by Senator Chris Dodd and Representative Donna Edwards). The pro-
posed amendment, which may not be a bad idea for the future of campaign 
finance reform, declares: “Section 1. The sovereign right of the people to gov-
ern being essential to a free democracy, Congress and the States may regulate 
the expenditure of funds for political speech by any corporation, limited liabili-
ty company, or other corporate entity. Section 2. Nothing contained in this Ar-
ticle shall be construed to abridge the freedom of the press.” H.R.J. Res. 74, 
111th Cong. (2010). 
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ticularly, legislative disclosure and disclaimer requirements for 
contributors of § 501(c)(4) organizations provide the best option 
for limiting the entity’s attractiveness to donors and withstand-
ing constitutional challenge. Although piecemeal reforms might 
lead to fears of donors exploiting the next unknown loophole,193 
something must be done to restore integrity to nonprofit enti-
ties and the electoral process by ensuring that social welfare 
organizations serve real societal interests—not veiled political 
ends. 
 
 193. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Show Me the Donors, SLATE (Oct. 14, 
2010, 4:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2271187/ (noting that the DISCLOSE 
Act failed to “bar secret contributions to nonprofit veterans organizations, 
leading to speculation that they could be the new front groups”). 
